OBJECTIVE & MOTIVATION
The objective of this paper is to undertake an empirical analysis of the factors leading to the crisis, the policy response of the sample countries, an evaluation of their recovery and the lessons that can be learnt. In line with this, the paper is designed to address the following four research questions; i) How had these countries performed in the years leading to the crisis? ii) What was the policy response to the currency crisis and what similarities/differences were there in policy response across countries? iii)
How have the sample countries performed post crisis and iv) what lessons can we learn?
We address these questions by analyzing the macro economic data of three 
SECTION 2

2.1: Overview of Literature
The need to understand currency crises has received much attention. This, has largely been due to the increased frequency of such crashes. Several alternative explanations have been put forth to explain currency induced crises. Broadly speaking,
we could categorize these into four broad categories Temporary illiquidity.
Structural Weaknesses and/or Policy Distortions
This is probably the most often cited explanation for currency induced crises. Krugman (1979) , views currency crises as speculative attacks resulting from deteriorating fundamentals. Budget deficits, excessive monetary growth, current account deficits and reserve losses are typical pre-conditions. When underlying fundamentals are inconsistent with the existing pegged exchange rate, a speculative attack results. More recently Frankel & Kose (1996) , using data for 100 countries over a 20 year period, find that there were several common features of crash countries.
Among these were (i) very high levels of debt financed by commercial banks on variable interest rates, sharp reductions in FDI inflows and overvalued exchange rates. Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) also find that exchange rate overvaluation are good predictors of impending crises.
Since an exchange rate regime is government determined, overvaluations are nothing but purely policy induced distortions.
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard arising from the existence of either actual or implicit guarantees have been put forth as yet another explanation. Most of the work have been within the asymmetric information framework. Frankel (1999) and Hahn & Mishkin (2000) 4 , argue that the combination of informational asymmetries, implicit guarantees and lack of transparency accentuate adverse selection problems making the underlying economies vulnerable. These vulnerabilities remain masked until just before the crisis. that for contagion and crisis to happen, there must have been some "degree of previous misbehavior".
Illiquidities
Depending on how one looks at it, the Asian Currency Crisis could be explained by all 4 of the above propositions. While factors like a self fulfilling panic or temporary illiquidity could have touched off the crisis, this paper will argue that prior to the crisis, there existed serious structural weaknesses and policy distortions in all three sample countries.
2.2: Pre-Crisis (1990 -96)
If there is one feature that can characterize economic performance in the three sample countries prior to the crisis, it must be the stellar growth record. Over the seven year period, 1990 -96, all three countries experienced very rapid GDP growth. Table 1 below shows the compounded annual growth rate and the cumulative growth for the period. The three countries had an average annual growth of 11.52% over the seven year period. This is indeed impressive performance by any measure. With cumulative growth above 100%, all three countries had more than doubled their GDP in the seven year period. It is not surprising therefore that these economies were referred to in glowing terms as "miracle economies". Yet in the subsequent two years, 1997 and 98, all three countries we reeling in trouble. So what went wrong?
The key to understanding what went wrong lies in examining how these GDP growth rates were financed. The growth pump was being primed by three broad means; a) rapid monetary growth, (b) large current account deficits and (c) capital inflows.
a) Rapid Domestic Monetary Growth
Rapid domestic monetary growth appears to be a common feature of all three countries in the pre-crisis period. Table 2 below shows how much the monetary lever had been used to fuel growth. (Tables A4, A5 in Appendix).
There is yet another way by which a high growth policy can lead to current account deficits. From a theoretical viewpoint, a country is likely to run current account deficits if it has a savings -investment gap. Essentially, the savings -investment gap reflects the net imports needed to finance the gap. Though East Asia is legendary for its high savings rate (approximately 35% of GDP) the very high investment rates needed to sustain the high growth objective has meant that the S-I gap was negative for all three countries in the seven years pre-crisis. Malaysia and Thailand had a negative S-I gap averaging 6.2% of GDP. Korea's was much lower at 1.7% (see Table A6 in Appendix).
c) Capital Inflows : -Reliance on Short-Term Inflows
The flip side of a current account deficit is a capital account surplus. Holding reserves constant, a current account deficit must be matched by a capital account surplus. What this implies is that; the net imports of the current account will have to be financed by foreign capital inflows. Table A9 shows the composition of these loans. Short term loans constitute more than two thirds of total loans for Korea. Thailand's exceeds 65% while Malaysia's is at 56%. Clearly, in all three cases, there has been a heavy reliance on short term inflows.
From Structural Weaknesses to Vulnerabilities
If the above factors show the structural weaknesses that were being built, a number of other policy induced distortions aggravated these weaknesses. Two such factors are worth noting. The first had to do with the exchange rate regime while the second financial liberalization.
All three sample countries were on quasi peg systems with their currency being managed within narrow bands. While such a system reduces currency volatility, it requires that domestic monetary policies be in conformity with that of the currency to which it is pegged. Since in all three cases the "peg" exchange rate policy had been to keep the domestic currency within a narrow band against the US$, monetary policy deviations were putting stress on the exchange rate. We saw in Table 2 above, how monetary growth in the sample countries was several fold that of the US for the 1990 -96 period. Additionally, annual inflation rates for the 3 countries averaged 5% for the same seven year period, while that of the US was 2.6%. Thus, by all parity measures, their currencies should have depreciated against the US$. However, since the exchange rate regime was to keep the currency within narrow bands, the currencies were becoming overvalued in real terms even though they were about the same in , meant that these currencies were ripe for a speculative attack. (Table A12 ).
When the exchange rate regime is seen with the financial liberalization that had been taking place, the build up in vulnerability seems to have been inevitable. Critics have pointed to the sequencing of liberalization as having been the problem. Instead of first strengthening the domestic banking sector before enabling them to source funds overseas, the opposite appears to have been the case -at least in Thailand and South
Korea. In 1993 for example, the Korean government removed controls on short-term foreign borrowing by Korean banks 7 . Since this was done while controls on direct access to foreign capital markets by Korean firms remained, the proportion of short term debt exploded and created a serious maturity mismatch. A similar situation was played out in Thailand. There, as part of Capital account liberalization, the Thai government established "The Bangkok International Banking Facility" (BIBF). Thai Banks used the 6 The low 1997 amount may also be due to reserves lost in defending the currency. 7 See-IMF Working Paper (WP/01/154) facility to raise foreign currency loans which were then recycled domestically as Baht loans. The rationale was the large interest spread that they were earning. That this was extremely risky from a currency exposure viewpoint was ignored. Thus in both countries the banking system had built up huge foreign currency loans and exposure 8 .
On the eve of the crisis in mid 1997, all three economies had also built serious financial sector fragility. The main contributor to this was the huge build up in leverageboth domestic and foreign. The build up in leverage being caused by the earlier monetary policy looseness and capital inflows. Asset bubbles, particularly, in the sectors most malleable to speculative activity, properties and stocks (shares) were a feature in all three countries.
Not only were the banks that financed this leveraging over extended, their situation was worsened by skewness in their direction of lending. In Malaysia for example, more than half of all loans were directed at the Broad Property Sector and financing of shares. Among the three countries, it was in Thailand that the property market bubble was worst. In Korea the lending was mostly to the Chaebols (conglomerates), resulting in debt/equity ratios of 4 or 5 times for these firms.
The result was that the domestic corporate sector was both highly leveraged and had unhedged foreign currency exposures. The domestic banking sector on the other hand, in having done the lending, was overextended and in Korea and Thailand had financed the lending with large amounts of foreign currency borrowing. 
SECTION 3: The Crisis Period -1997 & 1998
The catalyst that led from vulnerability to full blown crisis was the speculative attack on the Thai Baht in July 1997. The initial attack worsened and spread as contagion to the other East Asian countries when it was revealed that the Thai central bank's level of usable reserves was much less than what was originally reported.
The speculative attack itself was not new. These same currencies had come under a similar attack in early 1995 following the Mexican Peso crisis. Whereas they had successfully defended their currencies in 1995, this time it was different. What was different this time was the massive capital outflow. With hindsight, it now appears that more than the speculative attack, it was indeed the capital outflow that led to full blown crisis. In Thailand for example, the estimated capital outflow as percent of GDP was 26% within the first six months of the crisis. This supercedes the largest ever previous record reversal of 20% of GDP for Argentina in the 1980s. The massive capital flight was probably the reaction to the vulnerabilities that had been building up and now laid bare by depreciating currencies.
Three things worked against the Central banks in their efforts to stabilize their currencies. Capital flight, low reserves and interest rates. Faced with capital outflows that were pressuring their currencies and low reserves with which to defend, the central banks had little choice but to float their currencies and raise interest rates to prevent a free fall. Given the highly leveraged nature of their domestic economies, raising interest rates was extremely painful and counter productive in some ways. Clearly, pre crisis events had provided speculators with the classic one-way option.
With depreciating currencies, rising interest rates became the mechanism by which the currency crisis was transmitted into a domestic banking sector crisis. By early 1998, all three countries showed signs of what in the literature is known as the "twincrisis". The banking sector in all three countries took a hit. As the corporate/real sector began to reel under sharply increased interest rates, Non Performing Loans (NPLs)
spiked. The banking was faced with near collapse. Table 3 below, provides a summary of key economic variables for the two year crisis period. The severity of the crisis is evident from the GDP growth numbers. All three countries experienced sharp contraction in growth over both years -particularly in 1998.
Average GDP growth for the 3 countries approximates negative (-) 8% for 1998, a sharp contrast to the 11.5% average for the seven years crisis. The sharp fall in GDP growth was due to significant reduction in consumption expenditure (especially in public consumption) and in Gross Domestic Investment (GDI). GDI fell an average 40% in (Table A13) , and a low inflation environment, the social cost would not have been substantial. This is especially so, when considering the fact that most countries have higher unemployment even in normal times. Overall, as Figure 1 below shows, the period of the crisis, effectively about 4 quarters, was sharp but short.
SECTION 4: Post Crisis Recovery
If policies during the crisis were contractionary, they were aimed at stabilization. Table A1 and their plot in Figure 1 , shows a decline and recovery pattern that appears the same for all three countries. Yet, this masks two key differences among the countries. The first was the very different government policy stance to the crisis and second, the vastly differently growth drivers fuelling the recovery. 
4.1: Different Policy Stance
Though the macroeconomic policies undertaken to counter the crisis were similar, the policy reaction was different. Faced with large capital outflows and a potential implosion of their domestic economies, the crisis countries had to either put a stop to further outflows or seek new inflows to avoid collapse. It is here that vastly different paths were taken. Malaysia chose to impose capital controls and peg its currency, while both Thailand and Korea chose the route of IMF financing. Given the immensity of the crisis, the IMF put together large official financing packages. These amounted to a total US$58 billion for Korea, $17 billion for Thailand and $36 billion for Indonesia 9 . The IMF packages had 3 initiatives, (i) official financing, (ii) requirements for structural reform and (iii) macroeconomic policies. As we saw in the previous section, despite these different paths, the macroeconomic policies to counter the crisis were largely the same.
4.2: Different Growth Drivers
While on the surface the recovery appears largely similar for all three countries, a deeper analysis of the data points to quite different growth drivers. These differences are most obvious when comparing Malaysian and Korean data. Malaysia's recovery appears to have been fueled by Government Consumption and very strong export performance. Korea's recovery appears much more broad based with less reliance on government expenditure.
In examining real sector variables of Tables A2, A3 The monetary sector data, reinforce the differences between the two countries.
Despite sharply reduced interest rates (3 month interbank rate Table A20 ), growth in Bank Credit to Private Sector and overall Domestic Credit growth (Tables A15, A16) remain anaemic for Malaysia but are strongly positive for Korea. Performance in the external sector as shown in the Current Account Balance, tells a different story. The Current Account which was in deficit for all three countries every year pre-crisis, turns positive (Table A17 ). This reversal is most prominent for Malaysia. Testimony to the very strong export performance on the back of an undervalued currency.
Unemployment, NPLs and Foreign Reserves : Korea Vs Malaysia
We examine three other variables, the unemployment rate, NPL (non performing loans) and Gross International Reserves to compare the relative recovery in our sample countries. 
4.3: Structural Reforms
Since leverage was at the heart of the crisis, the main aim of structural reforms in all three countries was "deleveraging". This was carried out in two steps. The first, to clean up the mess from the crisis and second, to strengthen the cleaned out structure that remains. The first step involved the intervention by way of capital infusion to it was in absorbing rather than closing down weak entities. Absorption was by means of mergers/acquisition. The second step of strengthening the system was fairly similar in all three countries.
Since there was a "twin-crisis", the structural reforms were aimed at both the In addition to AMCs, the banking sector in all three countries underwent major restructuring. Weaker banks were merged or allowed to be acquired by stronger ones.
In Thailand and Korea, foreign acquisition or foreign equity participation in domestic banks was made possible. This was in line with IMF policies to do away with weak banks. In Malaysia, a wave of central bank orchestrated mergers led from 37 commercial banks pre-crisis to ten currently.
Section 5: Conclusion -What Can We Learn
In identifying the lessons that we can learn from the crisis and recovery, we begin with a synopsis of our analysis thus far. A number of commonalities are apparent. In the period leading to the crisis, there clearly were structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities in all three countries. These structural problems were very much in line with Krugman (1979) . The hypothesis that this was a self-fulfilling crisis ala Sachs et al (1996, 2001) , implying a previous degree of misbehavior is also applicable.
The key commonality across all three countries is the similarity in growth patterns during the 13 year period of this study. All three had very impressive growth pre-crisis, were hit just as hard during the crisis and had an equally impressive recovery.
The reason for this is obvious, all three countries had similar macroeconomic and structural reform policies. This, despite Malaysian government rhetoric that they were on an unorthodox path, whereas Korea and Thailand on orthodox IMF style policies. (Table A18) , much higher than Thailand's and in sharp contrast to South Korea's budget surpluses. Neither of these two growth drivers are sustainable over the long term. Private consumption, domestic investment, credit growth and foreign capital inflows must recover if growth is to be sustainable.
While Thailand's recovery and growth resembles that of Malaysia, Korea has outpaced both. In addition to faster GDP growth, Korea which followed the orthodox IMF package has done better when we go by factors such as, unemployment rate, NPL, International Reserves, Market Capitalization 13 and overall breadth of recovery.
Lessons
So, what can we learn from the experience of these countries? A number of useful lessons can be deduced. The first and most obvious lesson is that vulnerability should be avoided. This means one has to be watchful about the build up of leverage / debt financing. Beyond a low threshold, the financing of such debt with foreign currency exposures must be avoided. Since the need for debt and external financing arises from the need to grow at any cost, governments must reorientate growth strategies. A slower but better quality growth strategy makes sense. One that has a better absorption rate of domestic resources and higher value added.
The sequencing of financial liberalization is certainly important. As we saw in the case of Thailand and Korea, inappropriate sequencing can be a major cause of vulnerability. In this regard, unless the banking system is strong and globally competitive, domestic banks should not be allowed to take on huge currency exposures.
Building a strong banking system would not be possible under the current protectionist mode. Banking systems should be subject to market discipline. Capital account liberalization while simultaneously protecting the domestic banking system may lead to the worst of both situations.
Developing less bank reliant financial systems would also be helpful. In all three crisis countries the financial sector was heavily bank dependent. The problem with this is that, risks get concentrated. Risks will be dissipated if alternative financing mechanisms are enhanced. For example, attention should be paid to building better bond and money markets.
The This again is unsustainable over the long term. There is a need to 'privatize' risk management by developing the markets and tools for hedging. Central banks should also pay close attention to the ratio of useable foreign reserves to short term obligation.
A low ratio is a sure sign of vulnerability.
In addition to the above obvious ones, there are three implicit lessons to be learnt from the experience. The first is that, the old government directed industrialization models may not be workable anymore. The worst culprits in all three countries had been the state connected conglomerates that were the result of such industrialization. It is these entities that had taken on the highest debt and foreign currency exposures.
The second implicit lesson is that temporary capital controls may not be as bad as previously thought. Malaysia's capital controls, were highly selective and effectively short in duration. 
